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
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Soviet Options Toward NATO

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Given NATO's present strategy, the study tries to determine what strategic options are open to the Soviets and what the NATO counter-measures should be.

The first part of this study offers an in-depth examination of the Soviet thought processes, as conditioned by ideology, capabilities and priorities, in an effort to enumerate Soviet options and likely areas of emphasis. The second part discusses one of these options in detail--Soviet use of subversive movements within the NATO nations as a means of achieving the Soviet design. In assessing the present subversive threat in Western Europe, particularly with recent developments in Portugal, Italy, Greece and Turkey, this study offers a timely warning of a very real Soviet threat.

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HELMS / VERDE DE LISLE
ADVISOR: LTC JANUARY

NATO STUDY

EFFORT

SOVIET OPTIONS

TOWARD

NATO

Submitted

by

Major Jean Verde de Lisle

Major Robert F. Helms II

May 1975

A. Purpose. This paper proposes to address the question of strategic options open to the United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in view of present North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategy and capabilities. Moving from the assumption that NATO will respond to an overt Soviet threat or attack against the NATO nations, this paper will address the question of USSR options in two parts. The first will concern itself with Soviet thought processes, as conditioned by ideology, capabilities and priorities. In this manner, the basis will be established for enumerating the options. The second part will develop the subversive option in considerable detail. Due to time and space constraints, the paper is of a general nature. This fault is fully appreciated by the authors, therefore, the intent, here, is to surface ideas which can be expanded in subsequent efforts.

B. Part I: Soviet Options. Logically, a listing of Soviet options could vary from "doing-nothing" at one end of a continuum to "massive-invasion supported by all available means" at the opposite end. Therefore, it would be rather pointless to attempt a listing of all possible options, which no matter how lengthy, could never be exhaustive. The effort, here, then will be directed toward the more feasible goal of enumerating the probable options that the USSR may choose to pursue. For this purpose, it is necessary to understand the three pillars which support Soviet foreign policies; i.e., ideology, capabilities and priorities. Therefore, each of these will be examined with a view toward developing a basis for enumerating the more probable options that the USSR may choose to pursue.

(1) Ideology. Persuasive arguments can be made to the effect that the role of ideology in influencing Soviet foreign policy is diminishing and that a more "business-like" approach is being taken by the present regime.¹ While there is considerable evidence available to support such an argument, it is also true that present Soviet leaders have been educated and matured within a Marxist-Leninist environment. Their response to social, economic and political phenomena, their perceptions of the foreign and domestic environments and their interpretation of history is conditioned by the ideology within which they have learned and practiced. Alvin Rubinstein summarized the role of Marxist-Leninist ideology in shaping the views of present Soviet leaders in the following manner:

Ideology provides the terminology and the methodological tools for an allegedly scientific interpretation of history, as well as the categories for dialectically viewing, assessing and rationalizing events. Facts are selected and ordered according to the leadership's evaluation of any particular situation, and developments are related to one another within a rationalistic system . . . Ideology provides the key to the unshakable laws of social development.²

Marxist-Leninist ideology forms a prism through which Soviet leaders select and study facts, draw conclusions, make decisions and view the interrelationship of Soviet Union and other nations within the international environment. Further, Soviet attitudes toward others are arrived at through Soviet perceptions of the outside world's

¹Hannes Adomeit, "Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behaviour: From Confrontation to Coexistence," Adelphi Papers #101, London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1973, pp. 31-33.

²Alvin Rubinstein, ed., The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union, 3rd ed., New York: Random House, p. 6.

motivation, policies and objectives. These perceptions, which are significantly shaped by the ideological prism, play an important role in conditioning the Soviet image of the outside world and, therefore, a corresponding role in the range and choice of foreign and domestic policy alternatives. For as Lenin stated: "Those who fail to understand this fail to understand even a grain of Marxism and of scientific, modern socialism in general."³

If one accepts this, then the following derivatives, which form the basis of Soviet relations with the NATO nations, are logical.

These derivatives are:

(a) Inevitable struggle and triumph of socialism over imperialism/capitalism. The Soviets believe that this struggle is continuing. In his report to the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party on March 18, 1919, Lenin stated:

We are not merely in a state but in a system of states, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must triumph in the end.⁴

One could reasonably argue that 1919 statements are no longer valid in view of modern weapons and the present world social, economic and political order. This view, however, is inaccurate. Soviet leaders and writers constantly reinforce the view of a continuing, and the need for such, ideological struggle. Whereas compromise may be accept-

³V. I. Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder," 1920, Selected Works, Vol. 10, New York: International Publishers, 1943, p. 112.

⁴V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. 8, New York: International Publishers, 1943, p. 33.

able within the military, technological or economic arenas, it is completely unacceptable in the ideological struggle. Brezhnev acknowledged this and expressed Soviet support for the continuing ideology struggle in the following manner:

Comrades, we have a powerful weapon against bourgeois ideology. That weapon is the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. We know its potency well. We are witness to the fact that our ideas are spreading more and more among the masses. Marxism-Leninism is on the offensive today, and we must develop that offensive to the utmost.⁵

. . . it is necessary to be prepared that this struggle will intensify, will become a still sharper form of the antagonism between the two systems.⁶

(b) Flexibility. Marxism-Leninism stresses flexibility and maneuver. In the words of Lenin, who was a serious student of Clausewitz:

Too often, has it happened when history has taken a sharp turn that the most advanced parties have been unable for a long time to adapt themselves to the new situation; they continued to repeat slogans that were formerly true, but which now have no meaning . . .⁷

To accept battle at a time when it is obviously advantageous to the enemy and not to us is a crime; and the political leader of the revolutionary class who is unable to tack, maneuver and compromise in order to avoid an obviously disadvantageous battle, is good for nothing.⁸

⁵Extracted from a speech by L. I. Brezhnev at the Moscow World Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties, published in Pravda on June 8, 1969, printed in Reprints from the Soviet Press, Vol. 9, No. 1, July 11, 1969, p. 46.

⁶Statement made by L. I. Brezhnev during a speech in Moscow for Fidel Castro and published in Pravda on June 28, 1972, printed in Reprints from the Soviet Press, Vol. 14, No. 2, July 28, 1972, p. 56.

⁷V. I. Lenin, "On Slogans," 1917, Vol. 6, Selected Works, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1936, p. 167.

⁸V. I. Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism," Op. Cit., p. 119.

(Through all of this the essential task for the party is) to remain true to its principles, to its class, to its revolutionary purpose, to its task of preparing the way for revolution and of educating the masses for victory in the revolution.⁹

Flexibility enables Soviet leaders to conceptualize and pursue peaceful coexistence with NATO nations, while simultaneously pursuing the ideological struggle. It further justifies the acceptability of making compromises and concessions with a stronger opponent as necessary to gain an advantage or to protect the Soviet Union. It also explains Soviet rationale for employing confrontation politics tactics as a component of a national strategy of peaceful coexistence with the US whenever it is possible to secure an advantage. Stalin formalized the peaceful coexistence strategy in December 1925 at the Fourteenth Congress of the CPSU. Later at the Fifteenth Congress he reemphasized the need "to postpone war by buying off the capitalists and to take measures to maintain peaceful relations." He further stated that "the maintenance of peaceful relations with the capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us" (the USSR).¹⁰

The formalization of a peaceful coexistence strategy with the west does not imply abandoning the pursuit of world communism. Peaceful coexistence is essentially a defensive maneuver designed to neutralize US military power while promoting the class struggle. Peaceful coexistence involves relations between states, but does not extend to forsaking the continuing class struggle. In the words of the December 1969 Theses of the CPSU Central Committee:

⁹V. I. Lenin, "Compromises," 1917, Vol. 11, Selected Works, Op. Cit., p. 208.

¹⁰J. V. Stalin, "Foundations of Leninism," 1924, Collected Works, New York: International Publishers, 1939, p. 288.

Peaceful coexistence between states with differing social systems presupposes an acute political, economic and ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism, between the working class and bourgeoisie . . . The principle of peaceful coexistence does not extend and cannot extend to the class struggle within the capitalist countries, to the ideological struggle, and to the struggle of the oppressed peoples against their enslavers.¹¹

Since it has been the Soviet pursuit of confrontation politics as a tactical maneuver within the conceptual framework of a strategy of peaceful coexistence that has resulted in the more acute US/USSR post-WWII confrontations and will more-than-likely provide the basis for future clashes,¹² it now appears appropriate to ask, "What is the function of confrontation politics within the acknowledged ideological struggle?" The answer appears to lie within the earlier discussion of Lenin's stress for the need of maneuver, timing and compromise in exploiting contradictions among the more powerful enemies of communism. Further, the benefits of judiciously using offensive measures as a component of an overall defensive strategy are well known. These factors seem to explain, to a large degree, the use of confrontations by Stalin to keep the west off balance and to gain time in order to consolidate the communist position within the Soviet Union. Khrushchev "adventurism," which repeatedly brought US/USSR relations into the arena of confrontations, can be viewed as a continuation of these

¹¹CPSU Central Committee, "Theses for Lenin Birth Centenary," published in Pravda, December 23, 1969, published in Reprints from the Soviet Press, Vol. 10, No.4, February 20, 1970, p. 43.

¹²See Urs Schwarz, Confrontation and Intervention in the Modern World, Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publishers, Inc., 1970 for further discussion of this phenomenon.

tactical maneuvers.¹³ The common fundamental characteristics of confrontations sponsored by Stalin and Khrushchev were to select sensitive areas, make exaggerated initial demands, to use bluff in threatening to employ Soviet military strength to obtain the demands and an ability to obtain compromise concessions in the process of de-escalating the confrontation.

Perhaps the lack of Soviet threats to use military force since Khrushchev was replaced by Brezhnev as General Secretary of the CPSU accounts for some views that the present Soviet leadership is embarking on a more business-like approach in foreign affairs. This view does not, however, account for the continued ideological struggle and the Soviet expressed readiness to provide support to further the cause of communism when possible. One must conclude that the views of Lenin, that it is not possible for the Soviet union to exist "side by side with imperialist states for a long time," remain valid and that the Soviet leadership has not forsaken the inevitable ideological struggle.

In the printing of Pravda in August 1973:

Peaceful coexistence does not mean the end of the struggle of the world social systems. Peaceful coexistence does not extinguish or cancel out class. . . . It is a new form of class struggle, which cancels only one type of struggle - war as a means of settling international issues - and will be waged right up to the complete and final victory of communism on a world scale.¹⁴

¹³For an excellent discussion of these factors of Soviet diplomacy see, Adomeit, Op. Cit., pp. 9-12.

¹⁴Quoted in Center for Advanced International Studies, Mono-graphs in International Affairs, Coral Gables: University of Miami, 1974, pp. xxii and 28.

(c) Soviet paradigm. A final determinate, relevant to this paper is the Soviet view of the world, particularly the continually shifting correlation of world forces. The Soviets claim that Marxism-Leninism permits them to reach "scientifically" correct assessments of the dominant short and long range trends in the world forces. Further, this permits the Soviets to accurately predict and influence the direction of these forces in favor of socialism. From Khrushchev to the present, Soviet writers and leaders express the belief that the shift of forces is inevitably moving in their favor and this is restricting western (NATO) freedom of action. In the words of Khrushchev:

. . . We must determine correctly the correlation of forces, to exploit new possibilities which the present era opens up for further advancement of our great cause . . . For the first time in history, the present balance of power in the world arena enables the Socialist camp to pursue the completely realistic task of compelling the imperialists, under the threat of the downfall of their system, not to unleash a world war.¹⁵

The Soviets do not expect the NATO nations to accept the shifting of world forces without attempting to reverse the process by force, if necessary. Soviet minister of Defense Marshal Grechko described the expected imperialist response in the following manner:

The course of modern social development confirms the idea expressed by Lenin that the more substantial socialism's victory is, the more stubborn becomes the resistance of the imperialist bourgeoisie. Not wishing to reckon with the lessons of history, imperialist reaction seeks a way out in various kinds of adventures

¹⁵Extracted from a speech by N. S. Khrushchev on January 6, 1961. Reprinted in US Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Sub-committee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Internal Security Laws, Washington: USGPO, 1961, pp. 53-54.

and provocations, and in the direct use of military force.¹⁶

If the NATO nations will not acquiesce in this process, then the USSR must possess an adequate means of forcing compliance and this requires military strength. According to Major General Ye Sulimov:

The reactionary circles of imperialism can only be forced into peaceful coexistence by making them renounce violent, armed methods of struggle. No considerations of morals, religion or international law and no consideration based on reason can halt the aggressive desires of the reactionary imperialist circles and the military-industrial complex if they sense their impunity and their superiority in strength.¹⁷

This brings this paper to the second pillar of Soviet foreign policy-military force.

(2) Soviet military capabilities. Within the last few pages, this paper has established that while professing coexistence, Soviet leaders sponsor a continuation of the ideological struggle. Further, the fact that the Soviets expect the NATO nations to use military force in attempting to reverse the current shifting of world forces has been discussed. Now the question of Soviet response to reversal attempts must be considered.

Earlier, Soviet sources were quoted in stating that "It (peaceful coexistence) cancels . . . war as a means of settling international issues." Although this may seem to rule out armed violence as a mechanism to further the ideological struggle, this is not the case.

¹⁶A. A. Grechko, "Triumph of Leninist Doctrine on the Defense of the Achievements of Socialism," quoted in Center for Advanced International Affairs, Monographs in International Affairs, Coral Gables: University of Miami, 1973, p. 234.

¹⁷Quoted in Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974 Monograph, Op. Cit., p. 27.

War, as referred to here, does not include "wars of national liberation" or "just wars." Khrushchev voiced Soviet disapproval of other types of war in the following manner:

We also soberly appraise the radical, qualitative change in the means of waging war and, consequently, its possible aftermaths . . . The nuclear bomb does not distinguish between the imperialists and working people . . . We also are in favor of socialism; but we (do not) want to gain it by unleashing a thermo-nuclear world war.¹⁸

Brezhnev voiced support for national liberation wars in 1972 when he stated: "We are bound by bonds of close combat solidarity to the present-day liberation and revolutionary movement."¹⁹ Kosygin echoed this theme in July 1972 when he stated:

The policy of peaceful coexistence . . . proceeds from the inadmissibility of the application of force in solving disputed questions among states. But this in no case means the rejection of the right of peoples arms in hand to oppose aggression or to strive for liberation from foreign oppression. This right is holy and inalienable, and the Soviet Union unfailingly assists people which have risen in struggle against the colonialists or have become victims of aggression.²⁰

Leaders in the Soviet Union do not expect to bring the ideological struggle to a successful conclusion without violence. Thus according to the Soviets:

¹⁸An Open Letter from the CPSU Central Committee to Party Organizations and All Communists of the Soviet Union, dated July 14, 1963, printed in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XV, No. 28, July 10-16, 1963, pp. 18, 20 and 22.

¹⁹Statement made by L. I. Brezhnev during a speech at a banquet honoring President Tito of Yugoslavia. Published in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIV, No. 23, June 5-11, 1972, p. 8.

²⁰Statement by A. N. Kosygin published in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIV, No. 27, July 3-9, 1972, p. 14.

The road for gaining power through arms is necessary and inevitable in conditions where reaction and the ruling class are capable of effectively using violence against the revolutionary movement . . . the armed uprising must occur in the presence of a revolutionary situation.²¹

For the bourgeoisie to give up power without armed struggle, it must be forced to do it with the help of revolutionary coercion. To force the bourgeoisie to give up power, the proletariat must have at its disposal superior force.²²

Whenever one considers the use of armed violence by the proletariat, the role of military forces must be included. Historically, popular uprising (as defined by the Soviet Union) have been resisted by the organized military forces controlled and manipulated by the bourgeoisie. Further, as the foremost imperialist military power, the US has responded to requests for assistance from the bourgeoisie to help in suppressing the natural, inevitable popular uprisings (revolutions). The US has heretofore possessed the capability to effectively project military power worldwide (e.g., Greece - 1947, Berlin - 1948, 1959 and 1961, Korea - 1950, Laos - 1961, Vietnam - 1964, Dominican Republic - 1968, etc.), whereas the Soviet capability to project beyond Eastern Europe has been limited. As a result, the US has been able to assume a global suppression role with little more than hollow threats to take counter-actions coming from the Soviet Union. The one significant attempt to project Soviet military power abroad, Cuba - 1962, ended in a humiliating retreat when confronted with US nuclear

²¹B. N. Ponomarev, "V. I. Lenin - The Great Leader of the Revolutionary Epoch," Kommunist, No. 18, December 1969, printed in Reprints from the Soviet Press, Vol. 10, No. 9-10, May 15, 1970, p. 12.

²²Statement by Colonel N. Kitayev, "Methods and Forms for the Conquest of Power by the Working Class of Capitalist Countries," published in Center for Advanced International Studies, 1973, Op. Cit., p. 79.

and conventional strength.²³

It can reasonably be argued that the Soviet leaders drew the inevitable military principle from the Cuban affair; i.e., it is one thing to project military power, but quite another to support and maintain it in a manner to permit effective utilization (e.g., Napoloen's invasion of Russia, Britain's military force in the American colonies, Hitler's invasion of Europe, Egypt and the Soviet Union, US involvement in Viet Nam, etc.). In 1962, Soviet military forces were designed to conduct a WW II, European type war. The navy and strategic air were seriously deficient in the capability to effectively project military strength.²⁴

Soviet leaders do not expect the imperialist nations to discontinue the use of force to maintain the suppression of popular uprisings and wars of national liberation. On the contrary, they understand that these nations will respond with military force and that, in most cases, the ideological struggle will be suppressed unless the Soviet Union has a military capability to deter the projection of US military strength. If the USSR does not develop this capability, its role as the leader of the world socialist movement is in danger of being negated and the ideological struggle will be lost.²⁵

²³For further discussion of this see, Adomeit, Op. Cit., p. 20.

²⁴Schwarz, Op. Cit., pp. 59-68 and 181-185. Also see Adomeit, Op. Cit., pp. 24-25.

²⁵Extracted from a seminar by Professor Jaroslaw Piekalkiewicz, Associate Professor of Political Science and Slavic and Soviet Area Studies at the University of Kansas, at the US Army Command and General Staff College. Professor Piekalkiewicz conducted his seminar during the 1973/1974 school year and the writer of these lines viewed an audio tape of the seminar in January 1975.

The Soviet Union presently considers the US deterred above the nuclear and general conventional war thresholds. However, the Soviets have not possessed a capability to deter US actions in the lesser intensity levels and it is toward this goal that extensive efforts are presently being made with tangible results.²⁶

Earlier, the manner in which the Soviets expect the NATO nations to react in their attempt to reverse the present trend was described. Marshal Grechko described Soviet readiness to repel Western aggressive intentions as follows:

We can state that the Soviet Army is an army of proletarian internationalism rendering aid to all those struggling against imperialism and for freedom and socialism . . . We love freedom, but the measure of our love for it has always been and will be readiness at any time and in any place to give a crushing rebuff to any aggressor if he dares to encroach on the security of our . . . allies and friends. Our international friendship and cooperation with revolutionary, liberation and anti-imperialist forces throughout the world are developing.²⁷

The growing international capability of the Soviet military and the changing relationship of Soviet interests and military capabilities to provide support for national liberation movements was highlighted by General of the Army A. Yepishev in 1972 as:

. . . under modern conditions, the defense of socialism is closely associated with furnishing comprehensive assistance to national liberation movements and to young states struggling to achieve their freedom and independence. Today it is obvious that the revolutionary achievements of our Soviet nation and also those of other nations would be under threat, were it not for the tremendous military power of the Soviet Union and other socialist bloc countries. If

²⁶For an excellent discussion of this see, Thomas Wolfe, "Soviet Strategic Thought in Transition," published by the Rand Corporation in 1964.

²⁷See footnote #16 above.

at times the imperialists evidence fear in carrying out particular actions, it is because they recognize the risks involved.²⁸

In the present era . . . a departing of the external function of the Soviet Armed Forces has logically taken place. It must be seen that socialism's military might objectively assists the successful development of the revolutionary, liberation movements and that it hinders the exportation of imperialist counter-revolution. In this lies one of the most important manifestations of the external function of the armed forces of a socialist state.²⁹

Whereas in the past, the USSR has been forced to rely primarily on large-scale military aid to assist its friends in their struggle against imperialism, the capability to use Soviet military forces to actively assist its friends is now becoming a reality.³⁰ Paralleling this development has been an increased stress by Soviet leaders on the external role of the Soviet Armed Forces to support the ideological struggle abroad. It seems as if the growing capability to project military strength is specifically related to constraining Western freedom of action.³¹ This feature is particularly adaptable to naval power as "the special features of the Navy as a military factor can be used in peacetime for purposes of demonstrating the economic and military might of states beyond their borders and protecting the

²⁸Statement of General of the Army A. A. Yepishev printed in Center for Advanced International Studies, 1973, Op. Cit., pp. 127-128.

²⁹Ibid., p. 128.

³⁰For an excellent discussion of the manner in which the USSR envisions using its military strength to further the ideological and class struggles see, Adomeit, Op. Cit., pp. 24-25.

³¹See footnote #25 above.

interests of a state abroad."³² According to Admiral of the Fleet, S. Gorshkov in 1972:

Our (Soviet) fleet currently fulfills an important international mission. Present in the seas and oceans it fetters the aggressive actions of imperialists. It must be reckoned with by the USA . . .³³

In a way of summary, it appears that the evidence supports the conclusion that the USSR is developing a projectable, conventional military force and that, once in being, this force will be used to further Soviet interests beyond its borders. Further, one can only reach the obvious conclusion that support of the inevitable ideological struggle is considered by Soviet leaders as a Soviet interest, even though the US must be considered an opponent in the struggle. Therefore, as the Soviet military capability to project matures, "no question of any importance in the world can be solved without our (Soviet) participation, without taking into account our (Soviet) economic and military might."³⁴

If viewed in this perspective, Soviet action, in alerting its seven airborne divisions for deployment during the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, is a demonstration in the use of Soviet military capabilities to achieve national interests. The Soviet alert was in response to a request for assistance from Egypt to halt Israeli advances and to save the encircled Egyptian Third Army which faced possible annihilation.

³²Quoted from a statement made by Admiral S. G. Gorshkov in his article, "Navies in Wars and in Peace," quoted in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXIV, No. 23, June 5-11, 1971, p. 22.

³³Ibid., p. 22.

³⁴Statement of L. I. Brezhnev during a speech at Minsk on March 14, 1970 and printed in Center for Advanced International Studies, 1973, Op. Cit., p. 228.

The US responded to the Soviet alert with a worldwide alert of its military forces and diplomatic pressure against Israel to halt its army's advances and to restrain from destroying the trapped Egyptian Army.³⁵ Thus, Soviet interests abroad were furthered via the threat of projecting a credible, projectable, conventional military force.

Marshal Grechko expressed the belief that it was the Soviet ability to deter the US that prevented a possible widened conflict. He stated:

It was precisely the change in the correlation of forces in favor of socialism . . . which prevented the dangerous eruption of the war in the Near East from assuming dimensions threatening universal peace.³⁶

(3) Soviet Priorities. Vernon Aspaturian writes that "to understand past or present Soviet behavior, it is necessary to be aware of which role is or was being given priority at the time of the behavior." He identifies the five roles that the USSR may assume as: (1) state, (2) party, (3) Russian nation, (4) non-Russian nation and (5) multinational commonwealth.³⁷ As a state, the USSR functions within a system of states and possesses all of the traditional properties of a state among other states. Within this role, the Soviet Union seeks to secure and advance Soviet state interests, as determined by priorities established in response to domestic considerations. The capability of

³⁵For a much more illuminating discussion of this event and the US and USSR involvement see, Strategic Survey, 1973, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1974, pp. 13-52.

³⁶Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974, Op. Cit., p. 34 provides this applicable quote.

³⁷See Vernon Aspaturian, Process & Power in Soviet Foreign Policy, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971, pp. 3-83 for an informative discussion of Soviet identities and role.

the Soviet Union to function is directly related to the capabilities and intentions of other state actors within the same environment. Thus, a state to state (s) interrelationship is present and must be considered by Soviet leaders in formulating foreign policy objectives and means.

As a revolutionary party, the Soviet Union seeks to perform the following roles and functions: (1) the ideological guardian of the multi-national socio-political order at home and the initiator and architect of its future development, (2) the ideological and organizational leader of the ruling Communist Parties and (3) the ideological leader and organizer of the World Communist Movement. As a dynamic instrument dedicated to replacing capitalist or imperialist governments with liberated proletarian communist governments, the party role advocates change and it, thus, seeks to alter the status quo. The pursuit of a party role has created a contradiction with the state role which must function within a system of states, for which stability is better suited. As the party role complicates and undermines the state role, the party role has been reduced as the Soviet Union's pursuit of the state role has been given priority.

The USSR is composed of fifteen nations of which the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) is but one among equals according to the constitution. However in real life, the RSFSR constitutes the hub of the USSR and its loyalty and dedication is indispensable for the survival of the USSR and the development of Communism. Therefore, priority is given to furthering RSFSR interests and to diffuse its culture and language among the other nations comprising the USSR. The priority attached to the maintenance of the RSFSR provides meaningful clues and must be considered in order to understand Kremlin behavior.

Although Russian nation state interests are primary, the USSR must also consider and respond to the demands/needs of the other fourteen nations in its role as a "variable nation-state."

As mentioned earlier, the support of these other nations is necessary for the maintenance of the USSR as one of the two superpowers. Therefore, Soviet foreign policy reflects an adjustment or compromise of conflicting national interests at the domestic level. In this manner, the USSR represents a pooling of resources from fifteen nations which permits these nations to achieve a collective strength greater than that which would be possible on an individual basis.

Finally, the USSR must be viewed as a multinational commonwealth. In its commonwealth role, the USSR has secured dominating influence in the so-called eastern European "satellite" nations and, in the process, has created a buffer of socialist or "friendly" nations between the Soviet homeland and the potentially aggressive capitalist nations of western Europe. Soviet state interests, in maintaining hegemony in this area, is strong and the USSR can be expected to react vigorously to any actual or potential alteration of the present status-quo.

An understanding of the roles or identities that the Soviet Union may assume provides a basis for dissecting Soviet behavior, but more is needed to provide a useful framework for predicting future foreign policy. Mr. Aspaturian identifies five input-output variables which affect the various Soviet roles and, thus, conditions and shapes Soviet foreign policy.³⁸ There are:

³⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 56-81 provides an excellent discussion of the manner in which these variables interact with roles to determine Soviet foreign policies.

- 1 - Motivations/Purposes/Intentions
- 2 - Capabilities/Power
- 3 - Risks
- 4 - Cost versus Benefits
- 5 - Opportunities

These variables, which are in constant dynamic interaction and, thus, are continually changing in relationship, provide a pragmatic basis of analysis for Soviet foreign policy. Therefore, if one understands their meaning and effect on the assumed role, it is possible to distinguish between Soviet rhetoric and intent. Mr. Aspaturian correctly argues that when Soviet statements coincide with the assumed role and available capabilities, Soviet intent is being presented. For example, Khrushchev's threats to revert to nuclear war during the 1961 Berlin Crisis did, in fact, coincide with available capabilities, but was contradictory to the preservation of the Soviet state and therefore, were not declarations of intentions. Conversely, current Soviet statements of support for the class struggle abroad and continued pursuit of detente with the US must be viewed as intentions. The increasing projectability of Soviet conventional military strength provides the capability of supporting the former while detente functions to neutralize western military strength. Further, these intentions are fully compatible with each of the roles with the exceptions of extreme detente which could endanger the multi-commonwealth role and a military confrontation with the US which could endanger the state role. As long as the USSR can avoid these extremes, it would appear that these are statements of intent.

The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that the preservation of the RSFSR is given first priority by Soviet leadership. Toward this end, ideology is reinterpreted to permit adjustments,

the support of the other fourteen nations comprising the USSR is required, a military establishment is being maintained and, lacking a natural barrier against foreign invasion, a barrier of "buffer" states has been created.³⁹ These things are in existence, but what actions are the Soviet pursuing to improve the world situation?

Foremost are the pursuit of superpower status, with accompanying global influence, and the establishing of governments which are friendly toward the USSR. Socialist or Communist governments are preferable, but not absolutely necessary, as the USSR has demonstrated an ability to enter into relations with other types. Given these priorities, what options can we expect the Soviet Union to pursue in its relations with the NATO nations? The more probable are continued:

- efforts to alter the status-quo in Western Europe in favor of the USSR
- pursuit of detente and avoidance of conventional war
- efforts to develop its influence among these nations, and to replace the US, as a superpower
- refusal to alter the status-quo in Eastern Europe

Translated into actions, the pursuit of these options will involve Soviet efforts to exploit contradictions among the NATO nations below the level of conventional war to:

- isolate the US
- fragment NATO solidarity
- strengthen Soviet economic and political influence
- accelerate the continuing shift of world forces in the direction of socialism

³⁹For a discussion of this see, Vernon Aspaturian, "The USSR and Eastern Europe in Political Perspective" printed in Parameters, Volume IV, Number 2, US Army War College, 1974, pp. 1-12.

- eventually, establish governments oriented toward and favorable to the USSR, rather than the US

Toward these ends, the USSR can be expected to concentrate energy and resources below the threshold of conventional war. Specific efforts will include:

- attempts to gain a decisive advantage in the MBFR or SALT arenas
- support of communist parties operating in NATO nations
- support of any faction or government which advocates favorable relations with the USSR
- actions in other areas; for example, Middle East, Africa, Asia, etc., designed to restrict the NATO nations freedom of action
- increased USSR - Western Europe trade
- support of subversive movements within the NATO nations, to include guerrilla warfare
- attempts to replace the Soviet image as being hostile and suppressive with that of being friendly and a liberator of oppressed peoples
- exploit contradictions among the NATO nations

This concludes the first part of this paper. Part two, which continues on the following page, discusses the Soviet use of subversive movements within the NATO nations as a means of achieving the priorities discussed above.

C. Part II: The Soviet Use of Subversive Movements. Weakening NATO countries' determination to resist to any type of aggression and bringing Western Europe into the Communist camp with a minimum of violence is, for the Soviet Union, the easiest way to achieve her goal. In this attempt, she can rely on the support of the Communist parties in Western Europe, which, with the exception of the Spanish CP, are legal in every country. Their strength, however, greatly varies from one country to another, with a popular support reaching more than 20% in Italy and France. Their real power by far exceeds the actual number of their supporters, due to their organization and their efficiency, particularly in time of crisis, as shown by the present events in Portugal.

(1) Role of the Communist Parties. The danger of a Communist takeover through legal or semi-legal actions is becoming more and more acute and insidious as most of the Communist parties have changed their tactics during the past ten years, officially moving off the Soviet Union and emphasizing their national character. Until recently they have been treated as subverters threatening the democratic institutions of their countries, and since the late 1940s they have been rather effectively isolated from other political forces and relegated to permanent opposition.⁴⁰ The Soviet Union's influence and control frequently compelled them to take positions that were incompatible with their own immediate interests. Within the Communist parties themselves, dissatisfaction and opposition spread, despite the unanimity of the Parties' Congresses. Another determining factor for a change was the

⁴⁰Dan N. Jacobs, The New Communisms, Harper & Row, NY, pp. 276-278.

development of the European Community which forced Communist labor and political leaders to accommodate their views and policies to the realities of European institutions. The tranquillizing image they offer now allows them to obtain a wider popular support among most of the classes of the society and to appear as a party like others which can offer a possible alternative to the present majorities. This is particularly true in France where they made alliance with the Socialist, and in Italy where they even did not reject the possibility of a coalition government including the Christian Democrats. The situation is particularly critical in this country presently under political and economic chaos. Many Italians would probably accept the risk if a compromise with the Communists could get them out of seemingly insoluble dilemma.⁴¹

Have the objectives of the Western Communist parties really changed? What assurance do we have that a Communist participation in a coalition government will not result, in turn, in the seizure of total power and the liquidation of all oppositions? What appears as a drastic change in policy is more likely to be a change in tactics. The argument used by the Communist parties that they are willing to "adapt Communism to national conditions"⁴² and to wield power without dictatorship is based on the motives of the masses which vote Communist on elections. It is obvious that an Italian Communism will differ from Russian Communism, just as Polish Communism differs from Russian Communism. The important fact is that France, or Italy, or both would be lost for the NATO Alliance, and the European Community would collapse.

⁴¹Time, Nov. 11, 1974.

⁴²Gerhart Niemeyer, Deceitful Peace, Arlington House, NY, p. 183.

Enrico Berlinguer does not let any doubt about those issues so far as Italy is concerned. If the PCI comes to power, Italy will withdraw from NATO. "The Atlantic tie is a mortgage on, as well as a threat to, the democratic development of our country," he says, and he specifies that the process would be accomplished in several steps, the first of which being the closure of the American bases and the renunciation to military integration. Italy would continue to be part of the EEC, but Berlinguer's aim would be to completely change the character of the EEC in order to bring about a "disarticulated" Europe."⁴³

It is a fact that Communist parties are torn between their allegiance to Moscow and the national conditions they have to take into consideration. The former, however, is likely to prevail in periods of crisis, as demonstrated by the attitude of the French Communist Party during the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The first reaction of the PCF to comply with the general mood was a resolution of the Central Committee on August 22, expressing its "opposition to any foreign military intervention."⁴⁴ The limitations of the disapproval, however, became apparent in the days that followed. A member of the Political Bureau, Roger Garaudy, was publicly censured for having criticized the Soviet intervention in an interview considered by the PCF as "inadmissible interference in the internal affairs of fraternal parties" (L'Humanite, Aug. 28). While other trade-unions planned a symbolic strike in solidarity with Czechoslovak workers, the CGT (the

⁴³Arriago Levi, Berlinguer's Communism, Survey Review, Summer 1972, Volume 18, No. 3.

⁴⁴Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1969, Hoover Institution Publication, p. 93.

Communist trade-union) warned against "attempts to organize anti-Soviet and anti-Communist demonstrations" (L'Humanite, Aug, 24). After the Czechoslovak leaders were taken to Moscow, the Political Bureau declared it a "positive fact" that an agreement had been reached, and in October rejected a proposal of the Austrian Communist Party for the convening of a conference of the West European Communist Parties to discuss the events in Czechoslovakia, terming it as "inopportune at the present time."⁴⁵

The examination of past history strongly recommends to be extremely suspicious about the Communist parties' real intentions. Coalitions are not new in the history of Communism. Communists came to power in Russia in company of other revolutionary parties which they eliminated as soon as they got control of the public means of power. Since then, coalitions have always been searched by Communists as the easiest and most reliable way to come to power.⁴⁶ When they failed, as in France and Finland in 1946-1948, it was due to the discovering of their tactics by their opponents who turned those methods against them.

The process of a Communist attempt to takeover is presently being experienced by Portugal. The scenario which occurred in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Poland, is taking place under the eyes of the paralyzed Western World: subversion of the institutions - mainly labor unions - control of the key sources of power as news media, then fabrication of incidents and arrests of citizens for conspiracy

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 329.

⁴⁶See Gerhart Niemeyer, Communists in Coalition Governments, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C., 1963.

against the new regime, putting into discredit moderate parties under the accusation of "resisting the process of democratisation and decolonisation."⁴⁷ The well known scenario is taking place again, and it is a feat of strength for a party which was 7,000 members strong three years ago according to estimations.⁴⁸ The present President of the Republic, General F. Costa Gomes, and the Movement of the Armed Forces are confident that they will keep control of the situation. "The CP is too linked to the MFA to disobey its orders . . . It has the radio, the television, and the newspaper; that should be enough for it," a MFA official says.⁴⁹ But it is precisely by controlling the means of communications that the PCP intends to subvert the country, and stating that the Communist Party should content itself with a small part of the power demonstrates a total misunderstanding of Communism.

Spain's political future is particularly uncertain, but the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) is speculating on the turmoil which is likely to follow General Franco's death to attempt a take-over. Although it is presently supporting the extremist movements which are spreading over the country since they contribute to one of the Communists' objective, i.e. undermining the regime, the PCE is shrewd enough to understand that, in a period of confusion as after Franco's death, a terrorist campaign would be a two-edge weapon and could serve as a provocation to the powerful extreme right. As did the Portuguese CP, the Spanish CP and its leader Santiago Carrillo seem to put their hopes in the military

⁴⁷V. Vladimirov, Portugal Following a New Road, International Affairs Review, Dec. 1974.

⁴⁸Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1973.

⁴⁹PARIS-MATCH, Feb. 8, 1975.

establishment, realizing that the armed forces will be the arbiters of the situation. They are making advances to the men in uniform, appealing to nationalism to get rid of the American bases, presenting civilian leaders as corrupt and inefficient, and even accusing Franco's regime not to spend enough on military equipment.

The Iberic peninsula falling to Communist hands would have a disastrous impact on NATO posture. It would mean for the United States to abandon the military bases, as the one in the Azores which played such an important role during the Yom Kippur War. It would mean access of the Soviet fleet into the Atlantic Ocean, and the possibility for Moscow to cut the lines of communication from Europe to America and to the African coasts, as well as the Cape road which is so vital to Western economy.

(2) Favoring Revolutionary Movements. Taking power through the legality of coalition governments represents one of the cards played by Soviet Communism in the attempt to dismantle NATO without taking the risk of a direct approach. It is the most difficult game, it demands patience, skill and an acute sense of opportuneness. It also requires favorable conditions: a strong Communist party like in France and Italy, or a revolutionary situation like in Portugal and possibly in Spain. But the general offensive is aimed at undermining Western peoples' faith into their own institutions and paralyzing their governments. The various actions are part of the overall scheme of subversion, which is not actually an appanage of underdeveloped countries but is directed against all Western countries.

(a) Action on Youth. The favorite Communist targets are schools and universities. Young people are easy to manipulate, they

are idealistic and do not feel at ease in the present wealthy and selfish society. Student uprisings are taking place repeatedly all over Europe as well as in the United States. In 1968, within three months, violent student manifestations occurred in the three major European countries: in Great Britain in March, West Germany in April, and France in May, and barely failed to overthrow the French government. Such a synchronization cannot easily be pure coincidence, and the fact that they attempted in all cases to obtain the support of workers shows the signature of Communism. Although the organizers of the riots defend themselves of the accusation of being Moscow's agents and represent a wide spectrum of tendencies - Trotskyists, Marxist-Leninists, Maoists . . . - , they actually play the game of Communism. Furthermore, the official opposition of the Communist parties in Western Europe to the "adventurist actions" of the extremist groups contribute to comfort the public opinions and to appear as parties of the order. The role of Moscow, however, has been clearly explained by the Comintern President George Dimitrov in a Lenin school lecture: "As Soviet powers grows there will be greater aversion to Communist parties everywhere. So we must practice the techniques of withdrawal. Never appear in the foreground, let our friends do the work."⁵⁰ Germany itself is not spared. Some 400 groups are dedicated to undermine the State by revolutionary violence. In 1972, the Ministry of the Interior estimated that there were 78,000 left-wing extremists active in FRG. The vast majority of these are pro-Russian Communists, the Maoists and Trotskyists accounting for only 7,300 and the total figure

⁵⁰Quoted in the Congressional Record, Aug. 22, 1958, p. 17719, Reprinted by Eugene H. Methvin in, "The Riot Makers," Arlington House,

amounted to 11,000 more than the year before.⁵¹ Another area of subversive effort is constituted by the 2.2 million foreign workers in FRG. They are the mass base for extremist activities. More than 200 organizations were created between 1970 and 1971 among foreign workers, most of them being left-wing and supported by German extremist groups. The illegal Spanish and Greek Communist parties have been particularly successful in recruiting among their compatriots and set up closely coordinated networks in more than 50 towns.⁵²

(b) Support of Regionalist Movements. In their attempt to weaken the Western world, the Soviets have found a potential domain of subversion in the regionalist struggles for autonomy. Several autonomist movements exist in most of the European countries, which can be exploited to weaken democratic regimes.

In Northern Ireland, the "Regulars" or "Officials" form the Communist faction of the IRA and oppose the capitalist government of Dublin. It is the militant wing of the southern Marxist political movement, the Sinn Fein, and is supported by the Communist Party of Ireland. There are evident proofs of international support from Eastern countries to the IRA, such as the discovering of arms and ammunitions of Czechoslovak origin.⁵³ Although the "Regulars" oppose the campaign of terror carried out by the "Provisionals," one can wonder whether the division between the two factions is not a tactic used by the Communists to disengage themselves from the accusation of

⁵¹Annual of Power and Conflict, 1973-1974. Institute of the Study of Conflict, London.

⁵²Ibid., 1971 edition, p. 16.

⁵³Ibid., 1973-1974, p. 20.

instigating Communist-oriented subversion, at the expenses of "irresponsible dissidents."

The same scenario is taking place since 1963, although on a lower scale. The extremist group ETA (Freedom for the Basque Homeland) is committed to revolution through violence as well as to Basque separatism. The ETA, like the IRA, split into Marxist and non-Marxist factions, the Marxist aiming at creating a mass movement of workers supported by the exiled Spanish CP. Student organizations, together with the ETA and backed by the growing Communist workers' Commissions, organized strikes and riots throughout Spain in 1972. In 1973, the renewed outbreak of violence, riots, kidnapping, sabotages, provoked the replacement of both the Minister of the Interior and the Chief of Police. The following repression provoked criticism among all classes of the society, especially among the clergy, against "the violence which oppresses the people."⁵⁴ The well known scenario, "provocation, repression, exploitation," is being fully exploited, mainly with the purpose of preparing the post-Franco era.

None of the democratic institutions is safe from Communist subversion, even the apparently strong and disciplined ones, like the police and the armed forces. The French Army is presently one of the main targets of the French CP. On two occasions, in November 1974 and in January 1975, subverters infiltrated in Army units organized soldiers manifestations in the streets. Although the official reason of the discontent relates to improvement of the conditions of life in the

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 25.

barracks, a "political platform" is being worked out to sustain the "committees of soldiers," and the acknowledged objective of the movement is "the disintegration of the tool used to defend the capitalist world against an Eastern enemy."⁵⁵ A French Communist official recently declared: "Whenever possible, we don't miss any opportunity to launch mass movements. The Armed Forces are in crisis: we are there."⁵⁶ Drafted young communists have precise instructions: first keep quiet, observe, and discuss with fellow soldiers. Then estimate if the situation is favorable, and popularize the party's policy. Be present whenever something occurs and try to politicize any demand.

In every revolutionary movement, one can find the undercover signature of Soviet Communism. According to Bernard J. Hutton, a former Czechoslovak Communist official, subverters are trained in Soviet Union and sent to Europe and to the United States. The networks are set up by the so-called Institute 631 initiated by Stalin in 1948, and presently directed by Mikhail Suslov. Several training schools exist in Soviet Russia, the most important of which is Gaczina, specialized in working in the English-speaking world.⁵⁷ In his book, "The Riot Makers," Eugene H. Methvin reveals the role played by Section D of the KGB for "Disinformation and Decomposition." "The object of the decomposer is by all conceivable means to undermine the faith of Western peoples in their own institutions and governments. This works hand in hand with disinformation, designed to make people believe that

⁵⁵Le Monde, Jan. 16, 1975.

⁵⁶L'Express, March 1975.

⁵⁷Bernard J. Hutton, The Subverters, Arlington House, NY, 1972.

Soviet society and Soviet policies are not what they are."⁵⁸

(3) Conclusions. Legal or semi-legal takeover in certain countries and subversive actions are, among the options open to Moscow with regard to NATO, those which seem to offer the best chances of success with minimum risks. They are presently being implemented, and could be reinforced by any type of direct action, should it reveal necessary.

The consequences of the Iberic Peninsula falling into Communist hands have already been mentioned. Another area where important events may be expected in a near future include the countries bordering the Adriatic sea. A coalition government including Communists may be formed in Italy within the next few years. In Yugoslavia the greatest hazards will be generated by Tito's death. One can expect then internal upheaval due to the dissensions existing between the different nationalities, and this would be an irresistible temptation for the Soviets to act, either directly or indirectly. If they chose direct action, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, there will be some protestations from the West, but will NATO's reaction go farther than verbal protest? The Communists undercover subversion will then show its effectiveness in undermining Western determination. The main disadvantage of direct intervention would rather be for the Soviets that it might generate some national upheaval directed against them in the country itself, and the Yugoslav Total Defense represents a powerful deterrent. Furthermore an intervention could cause strong anti-soviet reactions in Rumania and Albania, as well as an anti-Communist campaign in Western Europe.

⁵⁸Eugene H. Methvin, The Riot Makers, Arlington House, NY, 1970, p. 206.

Moscow will more likely utilize the Yugoslav Army itself as a mean to penetrate into the country. A key group of pro-Soviet Serbian officers and politicians backed by the threat of the use of Soviet power could succeed in taking power. An Army coup in Belgrade could also spark off a civil war ultimately involving the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean Sea.

In the eventuality of a pro-Soviet government in Belgrade, the Soviet Union would have achieved one of her primary objectives, i.e. free access to the Mediterranean Sea. She also would be in the position to apply direct pressure on Rome, and thus back the Italian CP in its attempt to takeover. Should Italy fall, the whole south flank of NATO would collapse. The Soviets would have dismantled the Alliance without taking any risk.